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I. INTRODUCTION
The recurring crises in medical malpractice litigation have been
widely discussed and documented over the past two decades.' In re-
sponse to these crises, a growing consensus has emerged among legisla-
tures, government agencies, and scholars in favor of tort reform.2
Indeed, virtually every state has passed some tort reform legislation.'
Despite the reforms, several serious problems persist in medical mal-
practice. The current tort system does not compensate injured patients
adequately or equitably, nor does it deter negligent practices suffi-
ciently. These failings occur despite the increasingly high costs to soci-
1. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMIS-
SION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1985); Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find Relief?., 49 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 1986).
2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL
LIABILITY AND MALPRACTICE 32-48 (1987) [hereinafter HHS REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 60-75 (1986) [hereinafter DOJ RE-
PORT]; see also Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Contractual Foun-
dation for Medical Services, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 201 (Spring 1986); O'Connell, Neo-No-
Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (Spring 1986).
3. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: SIX STATE CASE STUDIES SHOW
CLAIMS AND INSURANCE COSTS STILL RISE DESPITE REFORMS 9 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 GAO STUDY];
see, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7B-1 to 55-7B-11 (Supp. 1988).
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ety of the tort system. Particularly troublesome is the impact of these
crises on the access to and quality of medical care.
In response to these persistent problems and the failure of conven-
tional tort reform efforts, the American Medical Association, thirty-one
national medical specialty societies, and the Council of Medical Spe-
cialty Societies have joined together as the AMA/Specialty Society Lia-
bility Project (Liability Project) to propose a new and comprehensive
alternative to the existing tort system.4 The proposal has three compo-
nents and is designed for implementation on an experimental basis in
one or more states.
The proposal first calls for an administrative hearing process to re-
place the civil jury system in deciding claims of medical malpractice.
Second, while fault is retained as the basis for liability, the proposal
modifies several of the other legal rules for determining liability. These
first two elements of the proposal are designed to bring greater rational-
ity, equity, and efficiency to the tort system's goal of compensation. The
proposal also includes reforms of the processes for educating, creden-
tialing, and disciplining physicians. 5 These changes will ensure that
physicians are of a high quality which, ultimately, is the purpose of de-
terrence in the current malpractice system.
Part II of this Article discusses the problems with the current tort
regime in medical malpractice. Part III describes the medical profes-
sion's proposed alternative, and Part IV explains why the proposed sys-
tem is superior to the current tort system in dealing with medical
injury. Part V concludes that the proposed administrative alternative is
fair to patients, physicians, and the public and deserves implementa-
tion, at least on an experimental basis.
II. RATIONALE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM
A. Failure of the Tort System to Serve the Goal of Compensation
The current tort system precludes many patients with relatively
small damage claims from receiving any compensation for injuries
caused by medical negligence. This preclusion of small claims occurs
because the potential recovery may not be large enough to yield an ade-
4. The full list of the members of the Liability Project is included in Appendix A at the end
of the Article.
5. The educational, credentialing, and disciplinary reforms apply only to physicians. The ed-
ucation, credentialing, and disciplining of other health care providers will continue to be per-
formed by their specific licensing boards. On the other hand, because many claims of negligence
involve several different kinds of health care providers, the new system for resolving malpractice
claims will apply to all health care providers in order to ensure efficient resolution of such claims.
The system will not have jurisdiction, however, over claims other than malpractice claims,
such as products liability claims, even if those other claims arise out of the same incident.
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quate contingent fee to permit the patient to enlist the services of an
attorney, particularly if the complexity of the relevant medical issues
requires a substantial investment of attorney time. According to one
estimate, most lawyers will not accept a medical malpractice case unless
the expected recovery is at least 50,000 dollars.7 Hence, the United
States General Accounting Office has identified "the need for the in-
jured party to obtain a lawyer to gain access to the system" as one of
the primary limitations of the current compensation scheme.'
Significant evidence suggests that a substantial number of potential
claims are never brought into the civil justice system. In his classic
study of hospital records in California, Don Harper Mills found a sur-
prisingly large number of injuries caused by negligent medical treat-
ment.9 The Harvard Medical Practice Study Group, in a more
sophisticated analysis, found comparable results in its 1987 pilot study
on the feasibility of a no-fault alternative.10 Professor Patricia Danzon
compared Mills's data on injuries with estimates of malpractice claims
in California for the same period of time." Professor Danzon concluded
that "at most 1 in 10 incidents of malpractice resulted in a claim at the
height of the malpractice crisis, and at most 1 in 25 received compensa-
tion."' 2 Adjustment of the California data to reflect the increased filing
of claims since the studies were conducted yields a similar result: only
twenty percent of negligently inflicted injuries are likely to give rise to
6. P. Weiler, Legal Policy for Medical Injuries 226 (Jan. 1988) (unpublished manuscript);
Tobias, Background Paper to TREATING MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 5 (1986) (concluding that "because of the stag-
gering costs of trials, many legitimate claims are never brought simply because they are not finan-
cially rewarding enough to attract a lawyer"). But see infra note 14.
7. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 23
(1987) [hereinafter GAO FRAMEWORK].
8. Id. at 30.
9. CAL. MEDICAL ASS'N, MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASMILITY STUDY (1977). It is far from clear
that all of the incidents Mills identified involved actual negligence by a healthcare provider be-
cause all he had available were hospital records.
10. See HARv. MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY GROUP, MEDICAL CARE AND MEDICAL INJURIES IN THE
STATE OF NEW YORK A PILOT STUDY 59 (1987). Of course, given the increased frequency of claims
since the 1970s, it is reasonable to expect that the number of incidents that are ignored has
decreased.
11. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 18-29.
12. Id. at 25. Other studies of malpractice frequency have reached similar conclusions.
Records of patients discharged from two hospitals in 1972 suggested that only 7% of injuries re-
sulting from negligence led to filing of claims. Moreover, the researchers felt that they had under-
estimated the frequency with which malpractice occurred. Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages
and Deterrence: An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282, 1286
(1978). Data from the American Bar Association indicate that only about 17% of malpractice-
related injuries result in claims. ABA Special Comm. on Medical Professional Liab., Report to the
House of Delegates 31 (1986).
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claims.13 In short, convincing data show that the civil justice system
fails to compensate a significant number of those injured by medical
negligence.14
Even when the current tort system provides compensation, it does
not treat similarly situated litigants equitably. The Rand Corporation
found that juries have awarded plaintiffs significantly greater
amounts-200 to 500 percent-in malpractice cases than in cases con-
cerning identical injuries not involving physicians as defendants. 5 Sim-
ilarly, in Miami, the average malpractice award was nearly 900,000
dollars during 1985 to 1987 compared with an average award of 265,000
dollars for all tort cases.
16
The current tort system also does not treat similarly situated mal-
practice plaintiffs equitably. Because large portions of the awards de-
pend upon subjective and emotional considerations, 7 some injured
patients recover nothing, some receive less than fair compensation, and
others recover amounts far in excess of their losses, both economic and
noneconomic.' Among patients with grave and permanent total disabil-
ities whose claims closed in 1984, for example, recoveries ranged from
a low of 10,000 dollars to a high of 2,472,020 dollars. 9 Among malprac-
tice plaintiffs generally, those with economic losses over 100,000 dollars
are not fully compensated, while claimants with economic losses less
13. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 25. This phenomenon of low rates of suit is not confined to
medical malpractice. Low rates of suit are widespread in tort law, generally. See Pierce, Encourag-
ing Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1295-96
(1980).
14. The infrequency of malpractice claims cannot be explained fully on the basis that most
injuries carry a probable recovery too low to justify the litigation costs. Professor Danzon found
that fewer than 15% of patients with major permanent disabilities due to malpractice filed claims.
P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 25.
15. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY
JURY TRIALS 55 (1985). The average medical malpractice award was five times the size of jury
award to similarly situated personal injury plaintiff and almost twice the size of average award in
product liability cases for similar injuries. Id.
16. See ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR THE REVIEW OF THE INS. & TORT SYs., PRELIMINARY FACT
FINDING REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 155 (1987).
17. D. DOBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 545 (1973). In particular, juries have virtually unbridled dis-
cretion in determining damages for pain and suffering. Although such injuries involve real loss to
the plaintiff, there is no meaningful way for anyone to measure this loss in monetary terms. Id.
Indeed, the unquantifiable nature of pain and suffering is one explanation for why people never
purchase insurance for these damages. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987).
18. Grad, Medical Malpractice and the Crisis of Insurance Availability: The Waning Op-
tions, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1058, 1067-68 (1986); Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical
Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (1984) (argu-
ing that the result is akin to a lottery); O'Connell, supra note 2, at 899-900.
19. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED
IN 1984, at 43 (1987) [hereinafter 1984 GAO STUDY].
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than 50,000 dollars are overcompensated.2 In sum, an important limita-
tion of the current civil justice system in the medical liability context is
the "unpredictable nature of and lack of uniformity in loss
compensation.
21
Moreover, the use of juries is an inefficient way to resolve medical
liability disputes. As Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has observed, deciding
whether a physician is at fault requires "exhaustive offers of proof from
both sides," resulting in practiced and confusing litigation.22 The fact
finder must make a determination of causation in the face of considera-
ble medical uncertainty about why illnesses strike particular individuals
at particular times. In addition, the fact finder must decide whether the
patient was treated appropriately whenever experts cannot agree on
that question. Lay juries in malpractice cases are ill-equipped to resolve
the arcane issues involved.23 Furthermore, juries cannot evaluate inde-
pendently the expert testimony24 almost always introduced in malprac-
tice cases to explain the two major elements of liability: failure to meet
the appropriate standard of care and causation. 5
The nature of medical knowledge compounds the difficulties
presented as a result of the jury's lack of expertise. Despite technologi-
cal progress, the appropriate treatment for a particular case is often
debated within the medical field because medical science remains an
art. The legal system, however, does not accommodate the fact that sci-
ence and medicine involve inherent uncertainty. Because of the com-
plexity of the issues, judges allow juries to hear medical views that may
not be scientifically credible.2
Moreover, the process of presenting issues to the jury through
questioning of an expert by counsel is not always calculated to educate
20. Id. at 44-45. One study of the fault system for automobile accidents found overcompensa-
tion in small cases, while plaintiffs with high economic damages often received less than 25% of
their loss. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimburse-
ment, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 780 (1967).
21. GAO FRAMEWORK, supra note 7, at 30.
22. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 899.
23. DOJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 63 (concluding that "[flay juries are a very poor mecha-
nism for second-guessing the judgment of established mainstream scientific and medical views");
see also Richardson, Rosoff & McMenamin, Referral Practices and Health Care Costs, 6 J. LEGAL
MED. 427, 443 (1985); Tancredi, Compensating for Medical Injuries, 1986 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 370, 372
(reporting that an important defect in the tort system is the jury's inability to evaluate medical
responsibility).
24. As a corollary, since advocates are required to educate juries on the complex medical
issues, discovery and the ensuing trials are lengthy and costly processes. Abraham, Medical Liabil-
ity Reform: A Conceptual Framework, 260 J. AM.A. 68, 70-71 (1988).
25. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
188-89 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Particularly important are failure to meet
the standard of care and causation, because these elements involve technical and scientific issues.
26. DOJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 62-63.
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jurors on the issues. If, for example, the attorney fails to clarify a point
to a juror's satisfaction, that juror is not permitted to ask any questions
of the witness which might help the juror to understand the basis for
the testimony.
27
Even under the best of circumstances, juries can never be as effec-
tive as specialized triers of fact at deciding malpractice cases because
jurors are exposed to the medical issues only once; consequently, they
cannot develop an institutional memory to aid them in deciding a spe-
cific dispute. This lack of exposure to medical issues not only impairs
jurors' ability to decide each case, but also increases costs2' and the
likelihood of inconsistency across different cases. Furthermore, since ju-
ries are not required to articulate reasons for their findings and award
determinations, their decisions cannot be scrutinized by insurers, law-
yers, and claimants to establish reliable predictions for future claims.
29
The uncertainty produced by the system undermines the appearance of
legitimacy and aggravates the problems of availability and affordability
of insurance. 0
These inefficiencies of the jury system lead to a very time consum-
ing dispute resolution process. According to conservative estimates, it
takes an average of over two years from the filing of a malpractice claim
until its disposition. 1 Claims in which indemnity payments are made
typically require more time. Cases involving substantial awards remain
outstanding for the longest period of time: some cases are still open
after ten years.3 2
B. Failure of the Tort System to Serve the Goal of Deterrence
Tort liability is an inadequate deterrent to negligent behavior in
medical malpractice. Because negligent behavior is not closely related
to the likelihood of paying an injured victim, the tort system does not
communicate effective signals to physicians. As discussed above, most
patients injured by malpractice never file a negligence claim. 3 Patients
27. L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 112-13 (1977).
28. Abraham, supra note 24, at 70.
29. M. Trebilcock, The Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern Tort Law, Presentation to
the National Conference of State Legislatures National Seminar, Controlling Liability Costs: State
Actions and Alternatives 405 (Dec. 14-16, 1986).
30. When tort liability and awards become unpredictable, insurers cannot effectively group
insureds into risk pools. Thus, premiums increase as the range of potential liability expands, until
at some level of uncertainty insurers are forced to withdraw coverage. Priest, supra note 17, at
1582-84.
31. 1984 GAO STUDY, supra note 19, at 33. Another report estimates that a malpractice claim
takes an average of seven years to adjudicate. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 18, at 1270 n.9.
32. 1984 GAO STUDY, supra note 19, at 33.
33. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
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often do not know whether a bad result is caused by medical malprac-
tice, a pre-existing condition, or an inherent risk of the accepted medi-
cal treatment.1
4
Moreover, whether an injury becomes a claim depends to a great
extent on factors other than whether the health care provider is culpa-
ble. The severity of a patient's injury and the personal relationship be-
tween the physician and patient are two often cited factors contributing
to a patient's decision whether or not to file suit for an injury. 5 Some
patients refrain from suing because they rely upon and trust their med-
ical care providers and do not wish to disrupt a longstanding physician-
patient relationship. 6 In particular, the tort system discourages Medi-
care patients from filing malpractice claims; these elderly patients file
claims at only one-quarter of the filing rate for patients younger than
sixty-five years old.31 Medicare patients fear they will not find another
physician if they sue their current one. Furthermore, contingency-fee
lawyers lack incentives to represent elderly patients: the expected
awards will be lower due to the decreased life expectancy and lower
earning capacity of senior citizens.38 The tort system thus fails to cap-
ture a sufficient number of malpractice claims to deter negligent medi-
cal treatment.39
Finally, claims that do enter the system and reach resolution may
result in over deterrence. Liability may be imposed in cases where it is
unwarranted. When the physician's practices are viewed in hindsight
after they have caused a serious injury, it is easy to overestimate the
risks and underestimate the benefits of those practices.40 Hence, the ef-
fect of the threat of tort liability on the quality of each physician's
practices is uncertain. This uncertainty increases the use of defensive
medicine and undermines deterrence effects.41
The existence of liability insurance42 further exacerbates the uncer-
tainty surrounding the question of what influence the threat of tort lia-
bility has on the quality of each physician's practices. The availability
of insurance distorts deterrence because insurers generally do not indi-
34. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 126.
35. P. Weiler, supra note 6, at 136; see also Book Note, 99 HARv. L. REV. 2001, 2002 n.12
(1986).
36. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 126.
37. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 18, at 1269-70.
38. Id. at 1270.
39. This problem is not unique to medical malpractice; it occurs widely among different
kinds of torts. See Pierce, supra note 13, at 1295-96.
40. Cf. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term, Forward: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 29-30 (1984).
41. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 125-26.
42. Grad, supra note 18, at 1063.
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vidualize premiums according to malpractice experience of physicians."3
Thus, good physicians and bad ones pay the same premiums within a
particular specialty.
An additional failure of the tort system highlights the need for reg-
ulatory deterrent mechanisms: only negligent behavior that results in
an identifiable injury qualifies as a potential claim. This aspect of the
tort system, known as the "defendants' lottery," treats similar negligent
behavior differently by imposing liability only on the defendant whose
unfortunate victim is injured and successfully establishes a compensa-
ble claim . Therefore, it is important to complement the indirect deter-
rence of tort liability with direct efforts to identify and correct
substandard medical practices. 45 The proposal's monitoring element is
designed to fill the void in the compensation system where negligent
activity occurs but escapes sanction.
C. Unjustifiably High Costs to Society of the Current Tort System
Society pays a heavy price for the current tort system's deficien-
cies. Over the past twenty years, for example, the frequency of malprac-
tice claims has soared. While there was only one claim per thirty-seven
physicians in 1968, by 1975 there was one claim for every eight physi-
cians. 46 In some states, including California, Florida, and New York,
there is now one claim filed for every three or four physicians.47 More-
over, these increases have occurred despite the absence of any medical
basis for their development. There also have been substantial increases
in the severity of claims, measured by the size of damage awards, espe-
cially for noneconomic damages. s Between 1975 and 1985, the average
medical malpractice jury award increased from 220,018 dollars to
1,017,716 dollars. 9
As a consequence of the increases in the frequency and severity of
43. See Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and
Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1206. By using deductibles together with experience ratings
for liability insurance, deterrence could be maintained. P. Weiler, supra note 6, at 139. Experience
rating, however, is not feasible in the context of insurance for medical malpractice. Id. at 139-48.
44. See Franklin, supra note 20, at 790-91.
45. P. Weiler, supra note 6, at 146 n.207; see also Shavell, Theoretical Issues in Medical
Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 35, 49 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978) (stating
that nonmarket mechanisms, such as licensing and education, may be necessary to assure compe-
tent and quality health care).
46. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 60.
47. 1986 GAO STUDY, supra note 3, at 17.
48. DOJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 35-42. On average, compensation for pain and suffering
accounts for 80% of the total award when the recovery for pain and suffering exceeds $100,000. Id.
at 67.
49. Id. at 35-36. Of the 363% increase, only 100% can be attributed to the decline in the
value of the dollar. Id. at 36, 42 n.41.
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malpractice claims, malpractice insurance premiums have skyrocketed.
In the mid-1970s, insurers imposed increases in premiums of up to five
hundred percent,50 and the total costs for medical liability insurance
rose from sixty million dollars in 1960 to nearly five billion dollars in
1985.51
The high costs of the system for resolving malpractice claims are
exacerbated by the system's inefficiencies. According to the best evi-
dence available, only sixteen to forty cents of each dollar paid in mal-
practice insurance premiums is paid as compensation for an injury
caused by medical negligence.2 In contrast, the administrative worker's
compensation scheme delivers fifty-five to seventy percent of premium
dollars to the injured claimant.53 Moreover, the monies received by in-
jured patients are substantially reduced by their litigation expenses, in-
cluding attorneys' fees and additional sums for expert witnesses.54
The civil justice system also imposes high intangible costs. Both
patients and physicians are subject to the anguish and lost productivity
of the tort system's lengthy proceedings.5 The increasing amount of
time that physicians must expend to respond to malpractice claims
compounds the problem of decreased access to medical care. For exam-
ple, a recent physician survey revealed that fifty-five percent of mal-
practice claims took three or more years to close. Moreover, the
system's adversarial approach is fundamentally at odds with the coop-
eration between physicians and patients that is vital to the provision of
quality medical care. Consequently, the civil justice system often com-
promises the integrity of the physician-patient relationship. 7
50. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 97.
51. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, APPENDIX: REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 509 (1973) with U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE: INSURANCE COSTS INCREASED BUT VARIED AMONG PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALs 25,
39 (1986).
52. See Grad, supra note 18, at 1072 & n.57; see also HHS REPORT, supra note 2, at 16
(reporting that other estimates show that 18 to 54 cents of each premium dollar compensates the
plaintiff).
53. HHS REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
54. Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical Mishap Compensation
(N.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 170, 172 & n.6 (1988). Estimates show that less than half of total
insurance premiums spent by health care providers is paid to the injured patients and only half of
those dollars actually compensates the plaintiffs for their injuries. A significant portion of awards,
usually a one-third contingent fee, goes to attorneys. Id.
55. See Moore & O'Connell, supra note 18, at 1268.
56. OPINION RESEARCH CORP., PROFESSIONAL LIABLITY AND ITS EFFECTS: REPORT OF A 1987
SURVEY OF ACOG's MEMBERSHIP 13-21 (1988) (report prepared for the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists) [hereinafter ACOG REPORT].
57. HHS REPORT, supra note 2, at 17; NAT'L INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUS-
TICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 10 (1983) (Report of the Ad Hoc Panel
on Dispute Resolution and Public Policy).
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The costs of the current tort system are threatening the availability
and affordability of insurance coverage and health care in many geo-
graphic areas in the United States and in many medical specialties.
Several of the major national insurance carriers, including Hartford,
Fireman's Fund, and Travelers, have stopped writing malpractice insur-
ance entirely. 8 In response to coverage limitations and enormous in-
creases in insurance premiums for certain medical specialties, many
physicians have curtailed their practices. For example, obstetrician-gy-
necologists increasingly are turning away from the practice of obstet-
rics. According to a recent survey of physicians conducted by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, almost one in
eight obstetrician-gynecologists has stopped delivering babies because
of concern over malpractice liability, with two-thirds of that group quit-
ting obstetrics before the age of fifty-five." Consequently, forty-four
percent of the counties in Georgia,60 forty-two percent of the counties in
Alabama,"' and thirty percent of the counties in Colorado6 2 no longer
have any physician providing obstetrical services. Even among obstetri-
cian-gynecologists still practicing, there have been sharp reductions in
the provision of health care, particularly with respect to high-risk ob-
stetrical patients. For example, while only 1.6 percent of obstetrician-
gynecologists in 1985 devoted less than 10 percent of their practice to
high-risk care, 45.4 percent of obstetrician-gynecologists in 1987 so lim-
ited their high-risk practice."3 The crisis in litigation also has led to cut-
backs in emergency care. The high cost of malpractice insurance for
surgeons forced five out of the six hospitals in Dade County, Florida's
trauma network to close their trauma units,64 and fifteen out of the
nineteen hospitals in Broward County, Florida to close or restrict their
emergency rooms. 5
D. Inadequacies of Other Proposed Alternatives
Because the existing judicial tort system imposes high costs on so-
ciety without serving adequately its goals of compensation and deter-
58. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 8-9 & n.23 (Spring 1986).
59. ACOG REPORT, supra note 56, at 5.
60. GA. OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SOC'Y, PHYSICIAN SURVEY (1987).
61. MEDMAL ASS'N OF THE STATE OF ALA., SURVEY ON OBSTETRICAL CARE (1985).
62. Calonge, Colorado Obstetrical Care Malpractice Study Report, COLO. MED., Feb. 15,
1988, at 63.
63. ACOG REPORT, supra note 56, at 6-7.
64. See Perspectives Insert, Crisis in Trauma Care, 42 MED. & HEALTH (K. Fackelnan ed.
Aug. 29, 1988).
65. See Sutton, Patients Wait for Malpractice Solutions, United Press Int'l (Sept. 20, 1987)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file).
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rence, it is reasonable to consider whether a more fair and efficient
alternative can be developed. While minor changes within the civil jus-
tice system may ameliorate some of the problems, these changes have
been tried for over a decade in most states without resolving the crisis
surrounding the availability and affordability of professional liability
insurance. 6 The uneven success of these reforms within the current sys-
tem justifies serious consideration of a proposal that represents a com-
plete alternative for resolving medical liability disputes.
Indeed, some states already have begun to explore more dramatic
departures from the traditional system. For example, both Virginia and
Florida recently enacted legislation establishing a no-fault compensa-
tion fund for a limited category of infants suffering from birth-related
neurological injuries." Commentators have called for more extensive
experiments with various alternatives to the present system, including
no-fault compensation for medical injuries" and contractual
approaches.69
After considering a wide range of alternative tort reform proposals,
we are convinced that a state administrative agency, applying a negli-
gence standard, would be best able to respond to the deficiencies in the
current system while simultaneously preserving the goals of tort law.
This administrative, fault-based system has several distinct advantages
over the other proposed alternatives.
No-fault systems, such as those proposed by Professor O'Connell, 0
offend notions of justice and individual accountability by imposing lia-
bility on health care providers even when they have done everything
humanly possible to treat a patient but were unable to prevent a bad
outcome. Although technically a no-fault system would remove any
stigma from the imposition of liability, health care providers and pa-
tients are likely to consider imposition of liability as a criticism of the
health care provider's competence.
Moreover, no-fault proposals do nothing to address the goal of de-
terrence. No-fault, including its latest manifestation as the Designated
Compensable Event,71 also was rejected by the Liability Project out of
66. See US. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. No AGREEMENT ON THE
PROBLEMS OR SOLUTIONS 3 (1986).
67. Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
766.301-.316 (West Supp. 1988); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Supp. 1989).
68. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 2.
69. See, e.g., Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 87.
70. O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical Treatment: A Propo-
sal for Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21 (1975).
71. Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 281 (Spring
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concern that either the costs of such a system would be excessive 2 or it
would be necessary to apply strictly scheduled benefits,7 3 and that such
guaranteed but limited benefits would be widely perceived as inade-
quate compensation. 4
The private contract alternatives, such as the one discussed by Pro-
fessor Epstein, 5 also were rejected, but for reasons different from those
that led to rejection of a no-fault system. First, contract proposals are
predicated on an assumption that patients and health care providers
are in equal bargaining positions. This assumption is subject to serious
question, particularly for poor patients who have little economic bar-
gaining power. 6 Second, the contract proposal does nothing to ensure
that medical malpractice claims are removed from the expensive and
inefficient court system. Patients who believe they have been injured by
medical negligence and who are displeased with the bargain they made
ex ante are free, and likely, to seek nullification of their contract in
court. The very fact that the court can examine the terms of the con-
tract to determine whether it should be voided adds an element of un-
certainty that the contract proposals were designed to eliminate. 77
Third, it is unclear how the patient and health care provider can draft
an adequate contract ex ante that will cover all situations which might
develop during treatment.7 8 To the extent a situation develops that
1986); A.B.A. COMM'N ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIAB., DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE EVENT SYSTEM: A
FEASIBILITY STUDY 9-11 (1979).
72. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 217-18; Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice-Trying to
Round Out the Circle, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 45, at 233, 239;
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: Its Cause and Cure, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,
supra note 45, at 245, 260-62; see also Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 590, 614-15 (1973) (questioning advantage of no-fault system because it would require costly
determinations of cause).
73. The concern was that such a system would have to function like the social security disa-
bility system or the New Zealand no-fault tort system. In 1974 New Zealand abolished medical
malpractice litigation and provided a compensation system for personal injury accidents and medi-
cal misadventures. Gellhorn, supra note 54, at 188-202.
74. Based on the experience with workers' compensation systems, commentators have con-
cluded that limited benefits inadequately compensate the injured for their full economic loss.
Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution:
A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 683, 715-18 & n.111 (1977).
75. See Epstein, supra note 69.
76. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients
and Providers, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 186-93 (Spring 1986); see also Zeckhauser & Nich-
ols, Lessons from the Economics of Safety, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra
note 45, at 19, 22 & n.7 (stating that communication and interpretation of medical risk information
is too limited and difficult to assure patients efficient and free contracts).
77. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 137; cf. Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its
Time Come?, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1233, 1253 & n.60 (stating that "[t]he vast amount of litigation
spawned by the 'work-relatedness' of injuries under workmen's compensation serves as a warning
against leaving too many factual issues open to dispute").
78. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 137. Although it is likely that standard contracts will be
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does not appear to have been contemplated by the terms of the con-
tract, it is more likely that a court will be persuaded to examine the
agreement's terms, find them unavailing, and resolve the dispute as a
tort action.
Finally, both the no-fault and contract proposals were rejected be-
cause they fail to address the need to improve the disciplinary system.
The contract proposals ignore the need to improve the skills of some
practitioners as an integral part of any plan to ameliorate the malprac-
tice crisis, relying instead on the market to persuade physicians that
they should maintain an appropriate level of skill.79 Although no-fault
could be integrated into a comprehensive agency that also has enhanced
disciplinary powers, the no-fault proposals to date have focused on
compensation without making any provisions for improving physician
skills as a way of decreasing the incidence of medical injury.
Thp medical profession's alternative advocates an administrative,
fault-based system for resolving liability claims to be implemented at
the state level. Through this system, which is to be administered by a
new state agency (the Board),80 patients, physicians, and the public-at-
large can realize important advantages over the existing tort system.
Under an administrative, fault-based system, patients will have greater
access to compensation for their injuries, and decisions on liability can
be made more predictably, quickly, and efficiently.
It is clear from every study done on the incidence of medical negli-
gence that there are more instances of iatrogenic injury than there are
claims of medical malpractice.81 There also is evidence that the threat
of liability is not a very effective deterrent to inadequate medical care.2
This evidence suggests that no system of liability determination and
compensation can, by itself, effectively identify, retrain, and discipline
physicians who are providing substandard care. For these reasons, the
Liability Project chose to integrate its proposal for an administrative
fault-based claim process into a specialized medical practices agency.
This specialized medical practices agency will have significantly
strengthened educational, disciplinary, and licensing powers and in-
creased resources to permit the Board to perform the expanded
functions.
The proposed system also is designed to enhance deterrence of sub-
developed over time, there always will be cases with unusual or unforeseen complications that were
not anticipated by the terms of the agreement.
79. P. Weiler, supra note 6, at 207.
80. The Board is modelled loosely on the example of the National Labor Relations Board. 29
U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
81. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
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standard practices. Under the proposal, the two types of state regula-
tion of the quality of medical care-resolution of malpractice claims
and direct oversight of physician practices-would be combined in the
jurisdiction of the Board and thereby coordinated more effectively. In
addition, the proposal imposes greater requirements upon physicians to
continue their medical education and adopt risk management measures.
Finally, the Board would be given greater authority than existing state
agencies generally have to monitor physician performance and respond
to substandard or unprofessional practices. The effectiveness of this en-
hanced authority will be ensured by the proposal's provisions for suffi-
cient staff and resources to carry out this new authority.
III. THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
3
As indicated above, the proposed alternative has three primary
components: a process for resolving medical malpractice claims, a codi-
fication and modification of the legal elements of medical liability, and
education, credentialing, and disciplinary reforms.
A. Claims Resolution
Claims of medical malpractice no longer will be resolved by a court,
but will be decided by the Board through an administrative adjudica-
tory process. In addition, strong incentives to facilitate settlement are
incorporated into the claims' resolution system. For those claims that
are not settled, plaintiffs will have to demonstrate the basic elements of
a malpractice claim-duty, negligence, causation, and damages-and
the adversarial approach will be maintained. However, claims will be
tried by experienced and qualified hearing examiners instead of ran-
domly selected juries.
The claims resolution function can be divided into four stages: the
prehearing process, the hearing, review by the members of the Board,
and judicial review. In addition, the Board will have rulemaking author-
ity to facilitate its claims resolution function.
1. Prehearing
Patients who believe they have suffered injuries because of inade-
quate health care will be able to initiate administrative claims by filling
out a simple form identifying the circumstances that serve as the basis
for their claims. Claims forms will be readily available throughout the
state and patients will be able to file the forms without the assistance of
83. A full description and a codification of the proposal can be obtained from the Office of
the General Counsel, American Medical Association, 535 N. Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill. 60610, or
the Vanderbilt Law Review, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn., 37240.
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an attorney. In the event patients do experience difficulties in complet-
ing the form, the state will provide a toll-free telephone number for
patients to call for help. The claims generally must be filed within two
years of the date on which the allegedly inadequate health care oc-
curred.8 4 The Board will employ claims reviewers to evaluate each claim
on the basis of a review of the medical records and interviews with the
patient, the health care provider(s) 5 named as respondent(s) to the
claim, and other individuals with knowledge of the relevant facts.
If a respondent makes a settlement offer while the claim is being
reviewed, the patient will be offered the services of an attorney em-
ployed by the Board to provide assistance in evaluating the offer.86 In
the absence of a settlement, the claims reviewer will complete the re-
view within sixty days of the date on which the claim was filed. If the
claim is found to have apparent merit, the reviewer will recommend
that the claim be pursued.87 Should the reviewer find the claim without
merit, a recommendation to dismiss the claim will be issued, accompa-
nied by a short statement explaining the recommendation. 8
Patients may appeal the claims reviewer's recommendation to dis-
miss to a single member of the Board who will then undertake a de
novo review of each claim in deciding whether to uphold the reviewer's
recommendation or to issue a recommendation that a claim be pursued.
If dismissal is upheld, patients still may pursue a claim with private
counsel by submitting an affidavit from an expert health care provider
attesting that an injury was caused by inadequate health care."
84. An extension of time for filing may be granted if the claim is based upon a foreign object
left in the patient's body and the patient reasonably could not have discovered the foreign object
earlier. In such a case, the extension is for one year after the date on which the foreign object is
discovered but in no case for more than four years beyond the date at which the foreign object was
left inside the patient's body. In the case of a child, claims based upon injuries that occurred
before the child's eighth birthday may be filed at any time through the child's tenth birthday.
Finally, if the health care provider fraudulently conceals the basis of a claim, the patient may file
at any time within two years after discovering the basis of the claim.
85. A health care provider is defined as any person, organization, or other legal entity that
provides medical or other health care services.
86. Alternatively, the patient may choose private representation. Health care providers will
continue to be represented privately just as they are today.
87. If the reviewer finds that the patient may have a valid claim against a health care pro-
vider not named as a respondent, the reviewer shall so notify the patient who will then have 20
days in which to add the unnamed health care provider as a respondent.
88. The claims reviewer may also find it appropriate to dismiss one or more parts of a claim.
For example, when patients are injured, they often name everyone who provided care even though
some of the health care providers were not involved in the specific incident that caused their inju-
ries. In such cases, the claims reviewer could dismiss the uninvolved health care providers from the
claims.
89. Very likely, there will not be many experts who will support claims or attorneys who will
pursue claims after they have been dismissed by a claims reviewer. Consequently, it is not ex-
pected that many claims will be pursued in this fashion.
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When the claims reviewer recommends that a claim be pursued,
the Board will enlist the services of a private physician to serve as a
peer reviewer, that is, a qualified expert in the health care provider's
field of practice. This reviewer will provide a second level of scrutiny to
claims similar to that currently employed by private liability insurers.
The peer reviewer will consider the documentation collected by the
claims reviewer and will be authorized to interview the patient, the de-
fendant health care provider(s), and any other relevant individuals. If
the peer reviewer also concludes that a claim has apparent merit, the
Board will assign the claim to an administrative law judge (ALJ) and
appoint a staff attorney to represent the patient in the subsequent set-
tlement negotiations or litigation. If the peer reviewer does not find
merit, the Board will hire a second, independent peer reviewer to review
the claim. If the second expert finds merit, the claim will be assigned to
an ALJ, and a staff attorney will be appointed.
In the absence of a recommendation to pursue by a peer reviewer,
claims will be dismissed by the Board, again accompanied by a short
explanation for the dismissal.91 At this stage there is no provision for
appealing a dismissal to the members of the Board. However, patients
again are provided the option to pursue their claims with private coun-
sel by submitting an affidavit from an expert health care provider at-
testing that an injury was caused by inadequate health care.2
2. Hearing Stage
An ALJ will preside over the subsequent proceedings. An ALJ will
be a full-time employee of the Board who hears medical negligence
claims and disciplinary charges against physicians.9 " The Board may
not employ as an ALJ any health care provider who has been in active
practice during the previous five years or any person who serves as an
officer, director, or employee of a health care provider or who has a
substantial financial interest in a health care provider."4 The ALJ will
supervise cases as they develop and decide any claims that do not settle
90. The patient may reject the Board-appointed attorney and employ a private attorney to
provide representation. The private attorney is prohibited from charging unreasonable fees, in-
cluding a contingency fee arrangement that exceeds specific limits: 40% of the first $50,000 recov-
ered, 33 1 % of the next $50,000 recovered, 25% of the next $100,000 recovered, and 10% of any
amount over $200,000 recovered.
91. The explanation will include a summary of the peer reviewers' reports.
92. After two peers have recommended a dismissal, it is very unlikely that a patient will find
an expert to support the claim or an attorney to pursue the claim. Consequently, it is anticipated
that this avenue almost never will be used.
93. An ALJ will not need to be an attorney or to have judicial experience.
94. AL.Js cannot undertake the provision of health care services or assume a professional or
financial interest in a health care provider during their service.
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before the scheduled hearing.
In order to encourage reasonable and timely settlements, the pro-
posal requires blind settlement offers by the parties at an initial pre-
hearing conference, 5 scheduled within sixty days after a claim is
assigned to an ALJ. A second round of blind offers will be required at
the final prehearing conference. A party will be subject to sanctions if
the outcome of the case is not a significant improvement over a settle-
ment offer that the party had rejected at the final prehearing confer-
ence.96 Thus, the potential sanction is imposed when each side has
access to the greatest amount of information and therefore when un-
realistic settlement positions are least defensible. 7
In the absence of a settlement, the parties will proceed to a hear-
ing. At least twenty-one days before the hearing date, each party will
provide the ALJ and each other party with the following: a list of the
witnesses expected to testify on that party's behalf accompanied by a
brief summary of each witness's testimony, the affidavit or deposition
testimony of each expert witness whom the party intends to call, a copy
of each document that the party expects to submit at the hearing, and a
short and plain statement of the factual and legal bases for the party's
position. In response, each party has the option of submitting a state-
ment that may include a description of testimony or evidence to be of-
fered in rebuttal, a list of objections to any testimony or evidence to be
offered by another party, or a short and plain reply to another party's
factual or legal argument. An oral hearing will be held if either party
requests a hearing or if the ALJ believes that an oral hearing will aid
significantly in resolving any disputed issues of law or fact. The ALJ
will have the authority to limit the subject matter of an oral hearing to
material issues genuinely in dispute.
The hearing will function like an informal trial: evidence will be
introduced under standards less exacting than in court, witnesses will
be examined and cross-examined, and attorneys will represent the par-
ties. The ALJ will have broader authority than a civil judge to conduct
the proceedings. For example, the ALJ will be able to question wit-
nesses at the hearing. Moreover, if after the conclusion of the hearing,
the ALJ is unable to resolve any specific issue because of a medical or
95. If the health care provider's offer equals or exceeds the patient's offer, the AIJ will
award the average of the two offers. If the offers do not overlap, the hearing examiner will attempt
to mediate a settlement.
96. The offeror of the rejected offer will receive compensation for the costs, expenses, and
attorneys' fees incurred after the final prehearing conference.
97. The AIJ also will oversee expedited discovery and ensure that the parties will support
their positions with valid expert evidence. Each party would be limited to 30 interrogatories and 3




legal matter in controversy, the ALJ may call an independent expert in
medicine or law to answer questions concerning the case. The parties
also will be able to question the expert.
The ALJ will be required to render a written decision with findings
of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days of the hearing. In the
decision, the ALJ will determine, based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence, whether the health care provider is liable for the claimant's in-
jury and how much should be paid in damages if a health care provider
is liable.
3. Board Review
The losing party will have thirty days within which to file a notice
of appeal. If no appeal is taken, the members of the Board will review
the ALJ's opinion. If the opinion contains a satisfactory statement of
the law and facts of the case, the Board will issue an order designating
the opinion as representing its views. In this way, the ALJ's opinion will
become binding precedent in future cases. If the Board does not desig-
nate the opinion as representing its views, the ALJ's opinion has no
precedential value, but it will bind the parties because no appeal was
taken by the losing party.
If an appeal is taken, the ALJ's decision will be subject to review
by the Board's governing members. The Board ordinarily will recon-
sider the ALJ's decision as an appellate body in a panel of three mem-
bers, one of whom will be a health care provider. The panel will subject
all legal issues to de novo review98 but must accept those findings of
fact that are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, for example, the
panel would accept an ALJ's findings that certain monitoring tech-
niques were employed by an anesthesiologist during an operation, but
would decide for itself whether the technique failed to satisfy the
proper standard of care and thereby caused injury.
After considering an appeal, the panel will issue an opinion adopt-
ing, modifying, or rejecting the recommended judgment of the ALJ.
The opinion will include a statement of the panel's reasoning. If the
panel finds a physician liable, the Board will report that fact to its
clearinghouse described in section C below."" The liable health care pro-
vider will have to pay the damages within thirty days of the award.100
98. The Board also will develop the legal rules for malpractice claims through its rulemak-
ing authority.
99. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text. If another kind of health care provider is
found liable, for example a nurse, a report will be made to the appropriate licensing board.
100. The intermediate appellate court of the state may stay the judgment upon petition of
the health care provider if the provider is likely to succeed on the merits on appeal. See infra note
123 and accompanying text.
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This requirement is based on the need to get money to injured claim-
ants as soon as possible and on the assumption that few, if any, cases
will be appealed successfully to the courts. In addition, by requiring
payment before a judicial appeal, the Board will eliminate any incentive
the losing party may have to appeal as a means of delaying the obliga-
tion to satisfy the judgment.
4. Judicial Review
Appeal from the Board's decision will be to the intermediate appel-
late court of the state. The review will be limited to whether the Board
acted arbitrarily or capriciously or otherwise abused its discretion. 01
The court will have no authority to establish medical standards or to
determine whether there was malpractice. If the court concludes that
an error has been committed by the Board, the court will remand the
case to the Board.0 2 The procedures for judicial review thereby ensure
that all ultimate decisions about liability and damages are made by the
Board.
5. Rulemaking
Similar to other administrative agencies, the Board should be given
rulemaking authority to implement statutory standards and require-
ments. The Board will exercise its authority in the manner prescribed
by the state's administrative procedures act. In addition, when public
notice of proposed rulemaking is required, the Board will notify the
state bar association, state medical association, state hospital associa-
tion, and any other relevant associations. These organizations will have
a direct interest in the administrative action and therefore will be able
best to provide useful insights.
In general, the Board's rulemaking authority will exist immediately
upon implementation of the proposal. However, the proposal creates a
five-year moratorium on rules that purport to define a standard of care
for health care providers. This limitation is designed to ensure that the
Board allows itself time to implement its other functions and an oppor-
tunity to develop experience and expertise in deciding liability issues
before undertaking such a difficult and sensitive task. The validity of
any rule promulgated by the Board will be reviewable by the courts on
the ground that it is arbitrary, capricious, or in excess of the Board's
statutory authority.
101. The standard of review is modelled on the standard applied by courts to decisions by
administrative agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
102. Appeal to the state's highest court will be governed by the state's existing procedures
for discretionary appeal to that court.
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B. Substantive Reforms of the Bases of Medical Liability
In addition to restructuring the procedures for resolving malprac-
tice claims, the proposal includes modifications of the substantive rules
for determining whether there is medical liability. Set forth below is a
description of the significant changes in the legal rules.
1. Standard of Care
The appropriate standard of care no longer will be based simply
upon the customary practices in the community, a standard by which
proper practices are determined on the basis of what similar health care
providers customarily do in similar situations. 0 3 Instead, the standard
will focus on whether the challenged actions fall within a range of rea-
sonableness, to be determined by reference to the standards of a pru-
dent and competent practitioner in the same or similar circumstances,
using available resources and contemporary principles, and which is
commensurate with the care and skill of others of similar training, ex-
perience, and/or certification. The Board will be required to consider a
variety of factors in determining the range of reasonableness, including
the expertise of the health care provider, the state of medical knowl-
edge, the availability of health care facilities,104 and whether the pa-
tient's medical problems limit the options available for treatment.
Similar to current law, this new formulation permits health care provid-
ers to employ a course of treatment that is recognized as appropriate by
a respectable minority of health care providers. 105
As is currently the case, expert witnesses will be required to testify
regarding the standard of care, 10 6 unless the negligence would be obvi-
ous to a lay person.10 7 However, as recommended by the Physician In-
surers Association of America,' the proposal requires expert witnesses
to have occupational experience in the field about whose standards they
103. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE T 8.04 (1988). A typical statement
of the standard is as follows:
A medical practitioner has the duty to apply to diagnosis and treatment of his patient the
ordinary skills, means and methods that are recognized as necessary and which are customa-
rily followed in the particular case, according to the standard of those who are qualified by
training and experience to perform similar services in the community.
Campbell v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 207, 210 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
104. The availability of health care facilities includes consideration of the accessibility of
transportation and communication facilities. Accordingly, health care providers are not at fault
when they fail to employ medical equipment or procedures that are not available in the local
community and which cannot reasonably be procured elsewhere under the circumstances. How-
ever, geographic location does not by itself affect the standard of care expected.
105. See Sprowl v. Ward, 441 So. 2d 898, 900 (Ala. 1983).
106. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, at 188.
107. See, e.g., Toppino v. Herhahn, 100 N.M. 564, 567, 673 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1983).





The causation standard for determining liability will be modified
significantly. Traditionally, when there was more than one possible
cause for the patient's injury, recovery has been denied unless the
health care provider was more than fifty percent responsible for the pa-
tient's loss." 9 Under the proposed causation standard, recovery will be
permitted if the provider's negligence is a "contributing factor" in caus-
ing the injury. A health care provider's conduct is deemed a significant
contributing factor if it substantially increased the risk of an injury and
such injury occurred.
Damages under this standard will be apportioned according to the
provider's degree of fault under a pure comparative responsibility stan-
dard. Thus, if the patient's pre-existing condition is responsible for
sixty percent of the patient's posttreatment condition and the pro-
vider's negligence is forty percent responsible, the provider is liable for
forty percent of the damages. As a corollary, the rule of joint and sev-
eral liability will be abolished so that health care providers become lia-
ble for damages only in proportion to their actual responsibility for
injuries.
3. Informed Consent
As is currently the law,110 health care providers will be obligated to
obtain informed consent before providing any health care services. Pa-
tients also will retain the right to refuse treatment."' The only signifi-
cant modification of existing law involves the standard for disclosure of
information in obtaining consent. The proposal adopts what is currently
the minority rule. The adequacy of the health care provider's disclosure
will be measured from the perspective of the reasonable patient and not
from the perspective of the reasonable provider. 1 2
4. Damages
Patients injured by malpractice will recover economic damages ac-
cording to current legal rules. Economic damages therefore will restore
injured patients to the position that they would have occupied "but
109. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 1982).
110. See 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 103, 22.01.
111. Bouvier v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1986);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923-24 (Fla. 1984); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347-48, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985).
112. 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 103, T 22.10.
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for" their injuries. These damages will be measured by the sum of lost
income plus the expenses actually incurred as a result of the injury.
11
Specific guidelines will be developed through rulemaking for the differ-
ent components of economic damages, including interest rates, work-
and life-expectancy, and the costs of medical, rehabilitative, custodial,
housekeeping, and childcare services.
Noneconomic damages will be capped at an amount that is tied to
a percentage of the average annual wage in the state. The cap will range
from about 150,000 dollars to 700,000 dollars, depending upon the life
expectancy of the patient before the injury. In addition, any award of
future damages will be made in accordance with a periodic payment
schedule if the present value of these damages exceeds 250,000 dollars.




In conjunction with its new authority to handle medical liability
claims, the Board will assume a greater role in the education, creden-
tialing, and disciplining of physicians. To enhance the quality of medi-
cal practice, the proposal requires all physicians to complete at least
fifty credit hours of continuing medical education per year. At least
thirty of these hours must be directly relevant to the physician's clinical
practice. All physicians also will be required to participate in a quality
assurance-risk management program."'
To ensure more comprehensive review of physician practices, the
proposal includes several kinds of reporting requirements concerning
the practices of physicians. First, hospitals periodically will be required
to review the performance of their physicians and to report any finding
that a physician's performance has been substandard. Second, insurers
will be required to report denials of coverage for reasons that are not
class based."' Third, courts in the state will be required to report any
criminal convictions of physicians. Finally, all physicians will be re-
quired to report suspected incompetence, impairment, and drug or alco-
113. See id. 1 18.01.
114. Collateral source payments refer to compensation from health insurance, disability in-
surance, and other similar benefits. Under the proposal, the patient could not receive double recov-
ery for an injury.
115. This program would include the implementation of measures to reduce the risk of injury
to patients, automatic review of patient charts to detect problems in care, required reporting of
adverse incidents with immediate investigation of those incidents, educational programs, and peri-
odic inspections of health care facilities to detect problem areas.
116. Physicians will be required to have adequate insurance coverage or, alternatively, they




hol dependence among their colleagues.
The Board will create and maintain a clearinghouse for the reports
from hospitals, insurers, courts, and physicians. The clearinghouse also
will receive reports of any settlements or awards made in the claims
resolution process and any notifications that disciplinary actions have
been taken by other states. 117 The Board will review a physician's com-
plete file whenever one of these required reports is submitted.
When review of a physician's clearinghouse file suggests substan-
dard or unprofessional performance, the Board will commence an inves-
tigation of the physician's performance. Investigations also will be
initiated when complaints about physician performance are filed by any
member of the public,"8 including Board members or ALJs who review
malpractice claims. Investigations will be conducted by committees on
professional conduct, which will have three Board members, one of
whom will be a physician. If there is reason to believe that the physi-
cian whose practices are under investigation poses a threat to patient
health, the committee will have authority to conduct an on-site review
of the physician's practices. Moreover, if it appears that a physician's
practices constitute an imminent threat to the health of any individual,
the committee may order the physician to cease those practices
immediately.
When appropriate, the committee will recommend that action be
taken by the Board's general counsel. 19 If there is evidence of alcohol-
ism, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, or mental illness, the committee will
recommend referral to an Impaired Physician Program, 2 ' whether or
not it has recommended action by the general counsel. If action by the
general counsel is recommended, the general counsel then will decide
whether to initiate a disciplinary charge. Once a disciplinary charge is
initiated, the general counsel will prosecute the charge before an ALJ
who will decide what action is indicated. The ALJ's decision will be
rendered after a full due process proceeding. The Board's policy is to
rehabilitate or reeducate a physician whose practices have become sub-
117. Much of the information that will be collected under this proposal overlaps with the
reporting already provided for, under current federal law. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,101-11,152 (Supp. IV
1986).
118. A formal investigation will not be launched on the basis of a lay person's complaint
until a claims reviewer has screened the complaint.
119. There are numerous grounds for disciplinary action, including the practice of medicine
without authorization, the fraudulent practice of medicine, gross incompetence or repeated negli-
gence, practice while physically or mentally impaired, drug addiction, commitment of an act of
sexual misconduct that reasonably calls into question the physician's ability to provide health care
services, or conviction of a felony.
120. An Impaired Physician Program is a medically directed treatment program for physi-
cians impaired by alcoholism, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, or mental illness.
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standard. If such efforts do not succeed, however, punitive measures
will be imposed.'' The examiner's action is subject to review by the
Board "'2 and the intermediate appellate court of the state.2 3 After a
final decision to discipline a physician, the Board is required to provide
notice of the disciplinary action to the physician's hospital(s) and in-
surer(s) and to the agencies that regulate the practice of medicine in
other states.
D. Board Structure
The Board will be governed by seven full-time members, of which
at least two but not more than three members will be physicians. Four
of the Board members may not be health care providers, and at least
one member may not have a professional or financial interest in any
health care provider. Members will be selected by the governor who will
choose from a list of nominees selected by a distinguished nominating
committee. Following selection, the members are subject to approval by
the legislature. The nominating committee will have ten members and
will be composed of physicians, other health care providers, attorneys,
and three individuals who are neither attorneys nor health care
providers.
The Board's members will have authority to hire the Board's em-
ployees.2 4 All the Board's employees will be selected and retained on
the basis of their ability and commitment to resolving efficiently and
fairly claims of negligence and complaints of substandard performance.
The Board's members also will have subpoena power to compel cooper-
ation with investigations conducted by the hearing examiners, claims
reviewers, or committees on professional conduct. Finally, the Board
will be given rulemaking authority in order to implement the provisions
of the proposed system.
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
A. Claims Resolution
A persuasive case can be made for employing a fault-based admin-
istrative alternative to the tort system. The proposed alternative re-
121. Punishments range from fines to permanent revocation of the physician's license to
practice medicine.
122. The Board will accept the hearing examiner's findings of fact if they are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
123. The court will uphold the Board's judgment unless the Board acted arbitrarily, in excess
of statutory authority, unsupported by substantial evidence, or in violation of its procedural
requirements.
124. The general counsel will be appointed by the Governor, and will be responsible for su-
pervising attorneys employed by the Board and for representing the Board in court.
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sponds directly to the flaws in the current system described in Part II
of this Article. Most important, the proposed system will permit more
injured parties to be compensated than does the current system. Medi-
cal liability disputes will be resolved more quickly and equitably than
they currently are. Claims resolution will be conducted more efficiently
and with greater certainty, thereby enhancing the predictability of com-
pensation for medical liability.
Under the proposed system, injured patients will enjoy far greater
access to the legal process than they traditionally have had. As previ-
ously discussed,12 5 a patient can initiate the administrative process
without enlisting the services of an attorney, and the state will bear the
costs involved in developing the claim. Once a claim form is filed, the
Board's staff will launch an investigation, including a review of the
medical records, interviews with the people involved, and consultations
with medical experts. This preliminary investigation will be done at no
cost to the claimant. If the staff deems the claim meritorious, the Board
also will offer free legal representation to the patient, who will be free
to accept the offer or to retain a private attorney. 126 In short, compensa-
tion will not be limited to the small percentage of patients whose poten-
tial damage award is large enough to attract private attorneys.
The broader access to the legal system initially should result in a
larger number of meritorious claims. On the other hand, claims in
which negligence or causation is not established will be dismissed
quickly. Moreover, claims without any out-of-pocket losses by the pa-
tient will not require adjudication, 21 although they may indicate in-
stances where a physician's medical practices warrant attention by the
Board.
The proposed system also will generate more reliable judgments.
The ALJs, selected on the basis of their qualifications and aptitude, will
replace randomly chosen jurors as decision makers. Furthermore, these
individuals will develop experience and special expertise in dealing with
malpractice claims. Expertise also will be made available by the provi-
sions for independent experts. The proposal's emphasis on medical ex-
pertise parallels tort law's traditional deference to the medical
community in setting the standard of care in malpractice cases. 1 8 In
both instances, the approach recognizes that juries often are ill-
125. See supra Part IIIA.
126. Patients whose claims were not viewed as meritorious also could pursue their actions
before the Board but only with the assistance of a privately retained attorney.
127. In other words, when collateral sources cover damages, the patient has no interest in
suing the health care provider since the collateral source rule is abolished under the proposed
system. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
128. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 103, 1 8.04.
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equipped to make judgments concerning the adequacy of a physician's
practices in a specific case. In contrast to the current situation in which
jurors frequently are swayed by purely emotional appeal, the proposal
should moderate award levels for two reasons. Damages will be decided
by dispassionate, experienced decision makers. In addition, the triers of
fact must explain in writing the precise basis for the amount awarded.
The proposal's procedural requirements also should lead to more
reliable and respected judgments. By employing a permanent staff of
decision makers who issue detailed, written explanations for their ver-
dicts and damage awards, the proposed system should ensure a higher
degree of consistency among judgments and, as a corollary, clearer guid-
ance to physicians and attorneys regarding the legal rules, of medical
malpractice. 1 2 Moreover, the explanations should ensure that the deci-
sions are more acceptable to the parties involved as well as to the public
generally.130
The third flaw in the current system addressed by the proposal is
the lengthy and costly judicial process involved in resolving disputes. It
is clear that it takes much longer for a dispute to be resolved by a jury
than by other, more specialized, triers of fact. It has been estimated
that jury trials consume sixty-seven percent more time than bench tri-
als.13 1 Similarly, workers' compensation hearing officers decide claims
more quickly than juries because they are more familiar with the medi-
cal terminology and the law. ' The potential time savings in having
medical liability disputes resolved in administrative proceedings instead
of by juries should be significant. These time savings are built explicitly
into the Liability Project's system with specific deadlines at various
steps in the process. Thus, the system can be designed so that no more
than one year should elapse from the filing of the claim to a final judg-
ment. This will be a significant advantage to patients and to providers.
Finally, the current tort system fails to provide reasonable compen-
sation because it frequently does not encourage settlements effectively.
Indeed, there are incentives for the health care provider to delay early
disposition of a claim. In particular, time favors providers because they
will have the use of the money until a judgment is satisfied. '3 Plain-
tiffs' attorneys also are encouraged to forgo early settlement. By going
129. This procedure is in contrast to the current jury system in which juries are not required
to articulate reasons for their awards. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
130. Traditionally, the reasons for requiring a written opinion from administrative decision
makers include guidance for future conduct and the promotion of the parties' satisfaction with the
result. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1941).
131. H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 71-81 (1959).
132. MARTIN URLING Co., PROTOTYPE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM
44 (1982).
133. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 18, at 1285.
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to trial, they preserve the opportunity for a big award. Even though
these attorneys may receive nothing on the contingency-fee basis if they
lose, they may be willing to risk losing at trial because they can spread
this risk among all their clients. In contrast, the injured patient has
only one case and bears the risk of not receiving any compensation.
13 4
The current system can be needlessly expensive, because it is not
designed to encourage settlements. By contrast, the proposed adminis-
trative system has been developed to promote early settlement of the
vast majority of cases and to limit the period within which all cases
must be resolved. For example, blind settlement offers 1 5 must be
presented at the initial and final prehearing conferences, and sanctions
will be imposed for unreasonable failures to settle. The judicial process,
which has a wide range of cases demanding the court's attention and
resources, is not readily adaptable to such changes.136 Accordingly, an
alternative system that clearly holds out the promise of resolving claims
in a more efficient and timely manner should reduce significantly the
costs per case to the parties. 37 In sum, the proposed administrative
model enhances the likelihood that injured patients will be compen-
sated in a fair, cost-effective, and expeditious fashion.
B. Physician Monitoring
The proposed system also is designed to enhance the quality of
medical care by strengthening the process for credentialing and disci-
plining physicians. As previously discussed, tort liability does not ade-
quately deter negligent behavior and therefore does not promote
quality health care.138 Thus, it is important to complement the indirect
deterrence of tort liability, which is retained in this proposal, with di-
rect efforts to identify and correct substandard medical practices. 39
The proposal's mandatory continuing education and risk manage-
ment programs will encourage physicians to maintain and enhance their
professional skills. A risk management program at Harvard Medical
School, for example, resulted in the development of standards and pro-
cedures for monitoring anesthetized patients that has been endorsed for
all anesthesiologists by the American Society of Anesthesiologists.140 As
134. Id.
135. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
136. The costs of delay are considerable. As mentioned above, only 16 to 40 cents of each
dollar paid in premiums are paid as compensation for an injury caused by medical negligence. See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
137. GAO FRAMEWORK, supra note 7, at 30.
138. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
140. Eichhorn, Cooper, Cullen, Maier, Philip & Seeman, Standards for Patient Monitoring
During Anesthesia at Harvard Medical School, 256 J. A.MA. 1017 (1986).
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a result of these efforts, malpractice should occur less frequently and
with less severity. Indeed, there is indirect evidence that these predic-
tions are correct. The anesthesia standards have stabilized, and even
decreased, malpractice premiums for some anesthesiologists. 4 '
The proposal's required collection of information regarding physi-
cian performance from multiple sources, including hospitals, insurers,
courts, physicians, and other members of the public, and the immediate
reviews of that information will enable the Board to detect many sub-
standard practices before they result in injuries to patients. Moreover,
because all physicians will be monitored, identification of negligent be-
havior will be far more effective.
Performance reviews triggered automatically by malpractice ver-
dicts and settlements; sanctions by hospitals, insurers or other states;
and complaints by members of the public also will ensure that substan-
dard practices are brought quickly to the attention of the Board. Once
improper practices are identified, the Board will respond with thorough
investigations, including on-site reviews of the physicians' practices.
The Board also will provide appropriate corrective measures, primarily
retraining and rehabilitation and, if necessary, discipline.
The drafters of the proposed system recognize a strong public per-
ception that existing state boards have not exercised adequately their
disciplinary functions." 2 Consequently, several measures have been
adopted to ameliorate this problem. First, the close coordination be-
tween the claims resolution function and the credentialing and disci-
plining process ensures that judgments of negligence will not escape the
notice of officials responsible for licensing physicians. Similarly, the
close coordination among state licensing boards will prevent disciplined
physicians from relocating their substandard practices to other areas. In
addition, the Board will be given a large, full-time staff. Hence, unlike
the situation in many states, where disciplinary efforts have been ham-
pered by limited budgets and part-time employees, 14 3 there will be suffi-
cient resources available for the Board to fulfill its responsibilities.
Finally, by joining health care providers with a diverse majority of indi-
viduals from other occupations on the Board, the proposal permits the
Board to be guided by professional expertise while avoiding the risk of
a Board dominated by any one interest group.
141. Anesthesiologists O.K. New Standards, Am. Med. News, Oct. 21, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
142. H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6384, 6385.
143. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 5540 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 36-37 (1986) (prepared statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector General, HHS).
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C. Substantive Reforms of the Bases of Medical Liability
As will be explained,"" the proposed system will not pass constitu-
tional muster unless it is a reasonably just substitute for the current
jury system. Changes in the legal rules for malpractice will provide part
of the quid pro quo for the elimination of the jury trial. The overall
design in formulating the revised rules has been to serve the fundamen-
tal goals of professional liability reform: fair compensation to injured
patients, deterrence of substandard medical care, and an efficient allo-
cation of scarce resources. In some instances, choices have been made
overtly to benefit patients. On the other hand, the system is not one-
sided. The current insurance availability problems are attributable to
weaknesses in the current legal rules, 4 5 especially those used to award
damages. Thus, modifications in those rules that benefit physicians and
insurers clearly are warranted to limit the pressure of insurance rate
increases.
1. Standard of Care
The primary motivation behind the change in the standard of care
is to ensure that the broad range of acceptable medical care is recog-
nized in law as nonnegligent. The proposed formulation, which is based
on the standards of a "prudent and competent practitioner," specifi-
cally will direct the decision maker to consider the full spectrum of fac-
tors that legitimately affect a health care provider's medical judgments.
These factors include the availability of medical facilities and the
health of the patient.
The traditional standard of care, which is based on "customary
practices,"'' 46 often has led physicians to be judged by unrealistically
high standards of care. Rather than permitting physicians to rely upon
the general good practices of the medical community, the customary
standard has permitted plaintiffs to present expert witnesses that focus
on perfect care. 47 In an era of rapid progress in medical knowledge and
techniques, it usually is possible to find an expert who will say that the
defendant failed to employ the latest and most advanced diagnostic or
therapeutic techniques, regardless of their practical availability or cost-
effectiveness.
Use of the current customary standard of care also serves to per-
144. See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
145. See generally DOJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-13; N.Y. ADVISORY COMM'N ON LIAB. INS.,
INSURING OUR FUTURE: REPORT OF THE NEW YORK ADVISORY COMMISSION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE 6-
15 (1986); Priest, supra note 17.
146. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 207, 210 (M.D. Fla. 1971). See gener-
ally 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 103, 1 8.04.
147. Epstein, supra note 72, at 52-53; Tobias, supra note 6, at 37-39.
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petuate the practice of defensive medicine. Defensive medicine is de-
fined as medical care that is provided solely to avoid possible litigation.
Once physicians begin to practice defensive medicine, the customary
standard necessarily tends to make defensive practices virtually
mandatory to avoid liability.
148
The vast majority of analysts who have examined the problems
with the customary standard have concluded that, despite its flaws, it
properly relies upon the medical profession to define its content.149 Ac-
cordingly, the "prudent and competent practitioner" standard is
designed to preserve the basic principle that decisions about liability
must be based on standards developed by the medical profession itself
while minimizing the flaws in the application of the customary
standard.
2. Causation
Redefining the rules of causation also eliminates a number of inad-
equacies in current law, in particular its inability to deal with a pre-
existing condition, such as a disease that predates the physician's con-
tact with the patient. Some courts have required patients to show that
the physician's negligence, as opposed to the pre-existing condition,
more likely than not caused the injury. Thus, unless the plaintiff can
show that negligence contributed more than fifty percent to the injury
for which compensation is sought, the plaintiff receives no compensa-
tion. 1 0 Other courts have allowed a finding of causation based on some
diminution in the chance of recovery or an increase in the risk of harm,
even if the physician's negligence was not shown to be more than fifty
percent of the cause of the harm. 15' Such inconsistency in legal result
demonstrates both the failure of the current rules to give meaningful
guidance on causation and the manifest unfairness of a legal rule that
leads to recovery in one court and to a denial of damages in another
court, even though the facts are essentially the same.
In contrast to the current all-or-nothing standard, the proposed
"contributing factor" standard for causation is inherently fair; all
health care provider negligence that is causally linked to a patient's in-
jury will give rise to recovery. Thus, the "contributing factor" rule per-
mits an injured patient to obtain compensation from a negligent
physician to the extent that the physician's negligence actually added
148. See Zuckerman, Medical Malpractice: Claims, Legal Costs, and the Practice of Defen-
sive Medicine, 3 HEALTH AFp. 128, 131-33 (Fall 1984).
149. See, e.g., P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 149.
150. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexist-
ing Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1365 & n.38 (1981).




The proposed rule also more accurately reflects the probabilistic
nature of medicine and medical injuries. It succinctly states and reflects
the uncertainty inherent in the practice of medicine today and avoids
the arbitrariness of cutting off all recovery at a fixed percentage of cau-
sation. Finally, the proposed rule discourages the inefficient allocation
of resources: currently parties spend disproportionate time and re-
sources litigating the issue of causation because the outcome of that
issue has all-or-nothing consequences. 152 The "contributing factor" rule
should increase the likelihood of settlement.
3. Informed Consent
The informed consent doctrine is an important vehicle for dealing
with the uncertainties inherent in the practice of medicine. Informed
consent brings the patient into partnership with the physician in deter-
mining the appropriate course of treatment. This partnership protects
the patient's right of self-determination and better prepares the patient
for the possibility that a proposed treatment will lead to unavoidable
injury.
153
Consistent with these general principles, the proposed adoption of
the current minority rule for the adequacy of disclosure of information
places greater emphasis on the patient's needs and desires for informa-
tion than does the current majority rule. The majority rule properly has
been criticized as underappreciative of patients' rights.154 Therefore, the
law should be modified to favor patients.
The proposed rule, by focusing on the patient's concerns, also holds
out the prospect of improving care by giving patients a greater role in
the process for making treatment decisions. Recent studies have found
that active participation by patients in their medical treatments has
therapeutic value. For example, patients may recover more quickly and
with fewer complications from their surgery when they are better in-
formed about the procedure and its potential effects, particularly if
they are given suggestions on coping with any difficulties that might
arise.' 55 The proposed rule also holds out the promise of improving care
by directing physicians to articulate benefits, risks, costs, and alterna-
tives more clearly, which in turn should improve the physician's ability
152. See supra text accompanying note 22.
153. Stuart, A Natural History of Health Behavior Decision-Making, in ADHERENCE, COM-
PLIANCE AND GENERALIZATION IN BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 9 (1982).
154. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
155. Wallace, Informed Consent to Elective Surgery: The "Therapeutic Value?", 22 Soc. Sci.
& MED. 29, 32-33 (1986).
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to make informed recommendations that are appropriate for a particu-
lar patient.
4. Damages
The reforms proposed for damages 56 address two overriding
problems with the existing system in regard to the size of damage
awards: inaccuracy and inconsistency, and therefore uncertainty and
unpredictability.
Damage awards are inaccurate and inconsistent for several reasons.
Current damages doctrine provides little guidance in establishing the
appropriate size of an award of noneconomic damages. 157 The lack of
standards, coupled with the requirement of deference to the jury's ver-
dict, are the most significant factors in increasing the size and unpre-
dictability of damage awards. In particular, noneconomic damages,
unlike economic damages, are not subject to definite maximum limits.
Consequently, multimillion dollar judgments are awarded that are un-
justified by the purposes of tort law. 5 8 Moreover, because all damages
are awarded in a lump sum payment with no subsequent modifications
to account for unexpected changes in circumstance, awards for future
damages are likely either to underestimate or overestimate the damages
that eventually are incurred.
The principles for compensation of noneconomic damages have
been criticized for resulting in overcompensation also because they are
decided after the injury has occurred. From an ex ante view, the
amounts awarded are clearly not justified. 5 9
An increase in accuracy in measuring damages and a concomitant
increase in the ability to predict accurately and insure against damage
awards is a change in the law that should be neutral in its effects on
patients and physicians. Full and fair compensation is an equitable
goal, and the achievement of that goal is in the best interests of all
parties involved in determining appropriate compensation for medical
156. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
157. 3 E. DEVITT, C. BLACKMAR & M. WOLFF, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL
§ 85.02 (1987).
158. See Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 595-96 & n.180
(1985).
159. Cf. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 152-56 (noting that compensating for nonpecuniary
losses often results in payments being made without regard to the individual's willingness to pay
for prevention); Priest, supra note 17, at 1547-48 (discussing "ex ante moral hazard," the theory
that because of insurance, the insured takes fewer precautions to avoid the loss). Not surprisingly,
the current approach for awarding noneconomic damages has been subject to forceful criticism.
See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 159 & n.16, 695 P.2d 665, 680-81 & n.16,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 383-84 & n.16 (citing additional authorities that criticize the current approach),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
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liability injuries. Moreover, increasing the accuracy of awards serves the
purposes of deterring malpractice and making the system economically
efficient.
Accuracy in calculating damages will be increased generally be-
cause the ALJ will approach the calculation as an expert, with a large
body of knowledge and experience to draw upon. More particularly, the
specific guidelines for determining economic damages will lead to
greater reliability and uniformity while reducing the transaction costs
normally involved when injured parties are required to develop exten-
sive evidentiary support for their claims of damages.
The limits placed on the maximum award of noneconomic damages
will ensure that those damages do not become excessive. However, the
proposal recognizes that flat monetary limits or limits tied to the
amount of economic damages, in some cases, may appear unfair to the
injured party. For example, in the case of a severely disfigured individ-
ual, a rule that limited noneconomic damages to the economic recovery
could be inadequate because actual economic damages might be rela-
tively small while pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life might
be substantial. Therefore, the cap on noneconomic damages is defined
by an amount equal to one-half of the average annual wage in the state
multiplied by the injured party's life expectancy. This community-
based standard of compensation provides a flexible approach to mea-
suring what is otherwise an unquantifiable measure of damages. This
limit is sufficiently large to allow full and fair compensation. Moreover,
providing an upper boundary on noneconomic damage awards will bring
needed certainty and predictability to the calculation of noneconomic
damages. Greater certainty and predictability are critical to promoting
the goal of available and affordable insurance.160
A limitation on damages also eliminates the "lottery mentality"
created by enormous, unjustifiable awards. Multimillion dollar verdicts
encourage patients to bring marginal claims, insurers to settle for unjus-
tified amounts, and physicians to practice costly and medically unnec-
essary defensive medicine.1
6 '
The capping of noneconomic damages can have important effects
on the quality of health care in addition to the restraint on increasing
insurance costs. Physicians are less likely to curtail their practices in
higher risk specialties like obstetrics or to avoid using new and innova-
tive procedures in their practices because of the fear of unmanageable
160. The sharp increases in the magnitude of noneconomic damages, see supra note 9, have
been particularly responsible for the uncertainty and volatility in rate-setting for malpractice in-
surance. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
161. The $65 Million Malpractice Question, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1986, at A24, col. 1.
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liability exposure. Similarly, physicians are less likely to employ expen-
sive but unnecessary tests and procedures to confirm their medical
judgment when such measures are motivated by the fear of exaggerated
liability exposure.
162
A limit on noneconomic damages is appropriate also because of the
provision of free legal representation for meritorious claims. Tradition-




All of the recommendations on damages are designed to further the
goal of ensuring that damages do not overcompensate or undercompen-
sate for the injury in question, without unduly increasing the transac-
tion costs incurred in measuring damages. Providing for more accurate
measures of compensation also should reduce social costs and increase
the predictability of damage awards, thereby making insurance cover-
age and medical care less costly and more widely available."6
D. Constitutionality
A key question about the proposed system is its constitutionality.
The system of trial by jury has strong historical roots in this country,
and there are significant constitutional and political limitations on the
range of alternatives to the civil justice system that can be implemented
on even a limited basis. As a constitutional requirement at both the
federal and the state level, the jury creates political legitimacy and sat-
isfies the community's need for vindication and civil justice.6 5 Conse-
quently, legislation that encroaches on matters "peculiarly within the
province of the jury" are suspect.' 6
While legislatures are substantially restricted from modifying the
162. Some courts have suggested that a limitation on damages is counterproductive because
it impairs the deterrence of tort law. See, e.g., Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 783 (Wyo. 1988).
However, as discussed, tort liability is not the primary mechanism for deterring inappropriate
medical practices. State medical boards monitor physicians through licensing, relicensing, and in-
vestigations of suspicious practices. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1261-:1292 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1989). Moreover, hospitals maintain high professional standards through peer review, risk
management programs, and continuing education offerings. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF
Hosps., AMH/88: ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 111-30 (1987).
Even assuming the centrality of tort law in deterrence, it is reasonable to assume that the high
amounts of damages still recoverable adequately will deter malpractice. In addition, the harm to a
physician's reputation from a finding of malpractice is a powerful incentive to practice nonneg-
ligently. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87 (1978) (finding
that the risk of financial loss to a nuclear power plant is a great incentive to avoid irresponsible
conduct).
163. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 18, at 1280.
164. See generally Priest, supra note 17.
165. Abraham, supra note 24, at 71.
166. See Boyd v. Bulala (Boyd II), 672 F. Supp. 915, 920-21 (W.D. Va. 1987).
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jury's role in personal injury claims, there is considerably more discre-
tion to eliminate causes of action entirely. It has long been the case that
"the Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abo-
lition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible
legislative object."'16  What is unclear is whether and to what extent an
alternative-a quid pro quo-is required by due process as a substitute
for the abolished cause of action.
In analyzing the constitutionality of the proposed system, a num-
ber of federal and state constitutional provisions are relevant. The pro-
posal will have to satisfy due process, equal protection, and jury trial
requirements under the federal constitution. The proposal also will be
subject to due process and equal protection scrutiny under the constitu-
tion of any state in which it is enacted. In addition to some states em-
ploying stricter tests than required by the federal constitution, 1 8 some
states have other relevant constitutional provisions, such as open courts
clauses,6 e that must be satisfied by the proposal.
1. Federal Constitution
a. Due Process
In analyzing the validity of this proposal under the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of substantive due process, courts almost cer-
tainly will adopt the traditional presumption of constitutionality and
require only a showing that there be a rational relationship between the
enacting legislation and a legitimate objective of government.170 The
United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts consistently
have viewed modifications of common-law tort actions as akin to eco-
nomic or social welfare legislation and, therefore, not subject to the ele-
vated standard of review applied when fundamental rights of a citizen
are infringed.'
17
Legislation enacting this proposal would satisfy the due process
standard of review for economic or social welfare legislation. Preserving
a patient's access to quality health care is not only a legitimate govern-
ment interest but indeed a compelling one.12 Similarly, the legislative
purposes of improving the compensation of malpractice victims and de-
167. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929), quoted in Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88 n.32.
168. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-88 (Fla. 1987).
169. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13.
170. For a general discussion of substantive due process, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 443-51 (2d ed. 1983).
171. See, e.g., Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 82-84; Boyd v. Bulala (Boyd III), 877 F.2d 1191, 1197
(4th Cir. 1989); Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1986).
172. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-27 (1905); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 112-13, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667-68 (1977).
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terring negligent medical practices are clearly legitimate. There also is a
rational relationship between these legislative purposes and the propo-
sal. As explained above,173 the proposal was designed to achieve more
equitable, efficient, and reliable compensation for victims of negligence
and more effective deterrence of negligent medical practices. Moreover,
by controlling the costs of malpractice litigation, the proposed system
will promote patient access to quality health care.
Some commentators have argued that the due process clause re-
quires a "reasonably just substitute," a quid pro quo, 74 when a tort
cause of action is abrogated by statute and replaced by an administra-
tive alternative. 175 The Supreme Court expressly has declined to impose
a quid pro quo requirement upon legislative limitations on tort recov-
eries, 17 but has reserved the issue for a later date. 17 Nonetheless, this
proposal does provide a satisfactory quid pro quo in exchange for the
loss of the common-law tort action. Most important, the implementa-
tion of an administrative model with free legal representation will mean
that more patients who are injured by malpractice will be compensated
for their losses. Many of those patients are excluded from potential re-
coveries under the current system. Common sense dictates that it is col-
lecting a judgment, not merely having a cause of action, that is of value
to a plaintiff.178 The liberalization of the substantive rules for causation
and informed consent also will ensure that more patients are compen-
sated for the harms suffered.17 9 Moreover, all injured parties will be
compensated more quickly, equitably, and efficiently. The investiga-
tions of claims by claims reviewers and the peer review of meritorious
claims will offer patients the benefit of discovery and an expert opinion
at no cost. 80 The use of expert triers of fact in an administrative sys-
tem ensures that claims are resolved in a shorter time period and with
173. See supra Part III.
174. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 87-88.
175. See, e.g., Note, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitu-
tional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 200-
01 (1981).
176. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 87-88; Boyd v. Bulala (Boyd I), 647 F. Supp. 781, 786 (W.D.
Va. 1986).
177. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88.
178. Cf. id. at 89-90; Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 120-21, 256 N.W.2d at 671.
179. This proposal, then, stands in contrast to traditional tort reform measures. In those
situations, the rights of malpractice victims are diminished so that society as a whole might bene-
fit. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I1. 2d 313, 328, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976)
(stating that loss of recovery to some victims is offset by lower insurance premiums and lower
medical costs for all recipients of medical care). Here, the quid pro quo directly redounds to the
benefit of the injured patients.
180. Cf. Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 120-21, 256 N.W.2d at 671 (noting that in return for minor
restrictions on the remedy, the patient receives assurance of collectibility of a judgment and the
benefit of the opinion of a panel of experts).
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greater reliability.
The proposal also meets the quid pro quo requirement by preserv-
ing the availability of medical services through stabilization of the costs
of liability insurance.""1 Finally, the strengthened mechanisms for edu-
cating, accrediting, and disciplining physicians will complement the lia-
bility system in maintaining and enhancing the quality of medical care.
b. Equal Protection
Of the three standards of review developed by the Supreme Court
under the equal protection clause-strict scrutiny, rational basis, and
intermediate scrutiny'182-the rational basis standard consistently has
been applied by the federal courts to judge the validity of tort re-
forms." 3 Of course, medical malpractice reforms treat victims of mal-
practice differently than victims of other torts and, within the class of
malpractice victims, treat those with injuries whose losses exceed dam-
ages caps differently than those whose losses do not. These distinctions,
however, do not create a suspect or quasi-suspect classification,8 4 nor
do they infringe upon a fundamental right. 8 5 In short, the rational ba-
181. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 160 n.18, 695 P.2d 665, 681 n.18,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385 n.18, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
182. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 170, at 590-99.
183. E.g., Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93-94 (finding the rationality of the Price-Anderson Act
ample justification for the different treatment accorded persons injured in nuclear accidents); Lu-
cas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 422 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Texas legislature had a
rational basis, and legitimate purpose, for enacting legislation that limited the extent to which a
patient could recover nonmedical damages); Boyd I, 647 F. Supp. at 786-88 (stating that the Vir-
ginia medical malpractice cap legislation is clearly a rational means to achieve the legitimate goal
of securing the provision of health care services).
184. See Boyd I, 647 F. Supp. at 786 & n.4.
185. Fundamental rights are those that are guaranteed by the federal constitution, either
explicitly or implicitly. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973);
Boyd I, 647 F. Supp. at 787. The right to a recovery for a personal injury is provided by the
common law and, therefore, as established by the Supreme Court over a century ago, "[a] person
has no property, no vested interest" in the rules of tort law. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134
(1877), quoted in Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88 n.32; Boyd I, 647 F. Supp. at 787.
The right to a jury trial may prevent a legislature from modifying common-law actions. Sophie
v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989). It does not preclude, however, a state
from abolishing a cause of action and replacing it with an administrative claim. See Silver v. Sil-
ver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929); Boyd H, 672 F. Supp. at 921.
States are split as to whether state constitutional guarantees to a jury trial may prevent a
legislature from modifying common-law actions. While courts in Florida, Kansas, Texas, and
Washington have determined that damage caps intrude on the jury's fact-finding function, most
recently the Virginia Supreme Court held that this fact-finding function is completed once the
extent of damages is ascertained and does not extend to the award of damages or other remedies.
Compare Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Kansas Malpractice Victims
Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251 (1988); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.
1988) and Sophie, 112 Wash. 2d at 636, 771 P.2d at 711 with Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps.,
237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989). Notwithstanding this division as to modifying common-law
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The validity of the proposed system under state constitutions is
more complicated because of the different constructions of state due
process and equal protection requirements and the relevance of other
constitutional provisions, particularly access to court and state right to
jury trial guarantees. In some states, the analysis simply follows the
analysis under the federal constitution. 187 In other states, tort reform
legislation is subjected to heightened levels of scrutiny. For example,
the equal protection or due process clause often dictates an intermedi-
ate level of review analogous to the federal equal protection clause's
middle-tier of scrutiny. 8 Alternatively, a quid pro quo is clearly re-
quired by either the state due process clause' 89 or other constitutional
provisions, including a right of access to the courts' 90 or prohibitions
against special legislation.' 9' The proposed system should satisfy the re-
quirements of middle-tier scrutiny because, as discussed, the proposed
system's administrative claim offers a reasonably just substitute, a quid
pro quo, for the loss of the tort cause of action.'92
Middle-tier scrutiny requires that the legislation be substantially
related to a legitimate or important government objective. 9 ' Decisions
under this standard have indicated three factors that are particularly
relevant to the analysis: the importance of the state interest, the extent
to which the legislative classification promotes the state interest, and
the magnitude of the burden imposed upon the disadvantaged class by
causes of action, the right to a jury trial does not preclude a state from abolishing a cause of action
altogether. See Boyd III, 877 F.2d at 1196.
186. Arguably, the proposed system offers an improvement over the current tort system for
victims of malpractice by providing patients with countervailing benefits when abrogating the com-
mon-law tort action for medical malpractice. Even though victims of other torts would not enjoy
the same benefits, there would be no equal protection problem. Legislatures clearly are entitled to
enact reforms on a step-by-step basis rather than all at once. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 305 (1976).
187. See, e.g., Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 497 N.E. 2d 763 (1986).
188. See, e.g., Bell, 243 Kan. at 342, 757 P.2d at 258-59; Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477
So. 2d 1094, 1109 (La. 1985); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931-32, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132-33 (N.D. 1978); Hoem v. Wyoming, 756 P.2d 780, 782
(Wyo. 1988).
189. Bell, 243 Kan. at 342, 757 P.2d at 258-59.
190. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1087-88; Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 690-91.
191. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 324-29, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741-43
(1976).
192. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
193. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1109; Carson, 120




In addition, even though the legislature's classification is not enti-
tled to a full presumption of validity, reviewing courts still must respect
the essential judgments of the legislature and uphold them once their
proponents demonstrate that the means and ends employed by the leg-
islature were considered carefully and that the method selected will fur-
ther the public interest. A state legislature is not obligated to employ
an optimal solution to a problem, merely one that is designed to correct
the evil at which it is aimed and which does not unduly impair the
rights of those affected by the classification.
According to these considerations, the proposed system is well con-
ceived and therefore should survive constitutional scrutiny. The govern-
ment's interest in improving the access of the public to quality health
care has long been recognized as a compelling government interest.
19 5
Similarly, legislative efforts to improve the compensation of malpractice
victims and deter negligent medical practices clearly are legitimate.
There is also a close relationship between these goals and the de-
sign of the proposed system. As outlined above,'96 the current tort sys-
tem has not served its objectives well. At the same time, it has imposed
heavy costs on the quality and availability of health care. The proposed
system addresses each of the failings of the current tort regime and
does so in a narrowly tailored fashion. Consequently, a key question for
the constitutionality of the proposal in a particular state is whether
that state has suffered the kinds of problems in malpractice litigation
that have occurred generally. Indeed, courts that have invalidated tort
reform legislation often have observed that no showing was made of a
serious problem in malpractice litigation in that state.'97
As to the final consideration, the burden of the legislation on the
disadvantaged class, the satisfaction of the quid pro quo requirement
perforce meets any concerns here. The burden is fairly balanced with
benefits that justify upholding the constitutionality of the proposal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Scholars and other commentators agree that the current tort sys-
tem is seriously flawed. 98 The Medical Liability Project has developed
an administrative alternative designed expressly to respond to the most
194. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-30 (1982); Carson, 120 N.H. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830-
31.
195. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb.
97, 114, 256 N.W.2d 657, 668 (1977).
196. See supra Part II.
197. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136; Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 824-25 (Okla. 1988).
198. E.g., P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 221. See generally Sugarman, supra note 158.
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serious defects in the current method of resolving medical liability dis-
putes. The proposed alternative is both comprehensive in its sweep and
consciously balanced in its treatment of the rights and interests of all
parties affected by the medical malpractice problem.
In designing its system for resolving medical malpractice claims,
the AMA/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project has aimed for
fairness: fairness to the patient, fairness to the physician, and fairness
to the public. The system should be more equitable than the civil jus-
tice system because it will provide compensation to more patients who
are injured by medical negligence, will result in more reliable determi-
nations of fault and more appropriate awards of damages, and will limit
expenditures for meritless claims and unnecessary transaction costs.
Consequently, the alternative system deserves implementation at least
on an experimental basis in one or more states to permit a fair evalua-
tion of its relative merits as against the current tort system.
APPENDIX A
Steering Committee Members
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
American College of Cardiology
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
American College of Physicians
American College of Radiology
American College of Surgeons
American Medical Association
American Society of Anesthesiologists
American Society of Internal Medicine
American Society of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons
Council of Medical Specialty Societies
Society of Thoracic Surgeons
Other Project Participants
American Academy of Dermatology
American Academy of Facial Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery
American Academy of Neurology
American Academy of Ophthalmology
American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head & Neck Surgery
American Academy of Pediatrics
American Association for Thoracic Surgery
American Association of Neurological Surgeons
American Association of Plastic Surgeons
American College of Emergency Physicians
American College of Gastroenterology
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American Psychiatric Association
American Society of Clinical Pathologists
American Society of Cytology
American Urological Association
College of American Pathologists
Congress of Neurological Surgeons
International Society for Cardiovascular Surgery
Society of Nuclear Medicine
Society for Vascular Surgery
